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Singer v. Magnavox Co.: Minority
Rights in Freeze-Out Mergers
I. Introduction
"Freeze-out" refers to an action taken by a board of directors or
majority shareholder that eliminates the interest or severely restricts
the power of minority shareholders in a continuing business enter-
prise.' While freeze-outs may be accomplished through the use of
several techniques, 2 one common method is a merger3 designed to
force the minority shareholders to surrender their shares in return
for cash4 or to accept debt participation.5 Such freeze-out mergers
1. See Gabhart v. Gabhart,- Ind. -, -, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977); Vorenberg, Exclusive-
ness of Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Rights, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
2. Methods by which stockholders may be frozen out by a corporation's majority include
reverse stock splits, tender offers or other share repurchases, sales of assets, and the issuance or
redemption of stock. The reverse stock split takes advantage of two common corporate code
provisions: (1) those provisions that allow charter amendments to increase or decrease the
number of authorized shares; and (2) those provisions that allow the repurchase of fractional
shares by a corporation. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 900,407 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§
242(a)(3), 155 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 801(a),(b)l 1, 509, 513(b)(1) (McKinney 1963).
Under these statutes the freeze-out is accomplished by amending the charter to reduce the
number of authorized shares so that most shareholders are left with fractional shares. The
corporation then simply exercises its power to repurchase the fractions. See Teschaer v. Chi-
cago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974); Clark v. Pattern Analysis and
Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See generally Dykstra,
The Reverse Stock Split-That Other Means of Going Private, 53 Ctu-KENT. L. REV. 1 (1976);
Comment, Reverse Stock Splits. The Fiduciary's Obligations Under State Law, 63 CALIF. L.
REv. 1226 (1975).
A tender offer involves an offer by the corporation to repurchase its own shares. While
the minority is not forcibly stripped of its shares, there is, nonetheless, an element of coercion
based on the possibility of lost liquidity if large numbers of shareholders tender. See generally
Comment, Going Private. An Examination of Going Private Transactions Using the Business
Purpose Standard, 32 Sw. L.J. 641, 644-45 (1978). On the subject of federal securities law
implications of tender offers and other share repurchases, see Moore, Going Private. Techniques
and Problems of Eliminating the Public Shareholder, 1 J. CORP. L. 321, 327-28, 340-48 (1976).
The freeze-out accomplished by a sale of assets generally involves a liquidation and sale
forced by the majority to themselves. See Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.
1941); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
In several cases shareholders have been frozen out or have had their interests diluted by
the redemption or issuance of stock. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353,
230 A.2d 769 (1967); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953).
3. For a description of the nature of mergers and consolidations, see F. O'NEAL,
SQUEEZE-OUTS OF MINORrry SHAREHOLDERS, 254-55 (1975). See also note 17 infra
4. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
5. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
cf. Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 103 NJ. Eq. 461, -, 143 A. 729, 731 (1928), afd, 104 N.J.
have generally been permitted by courts6 because first, many state
corporation statutes appear on their face to sanction freeze-out merg-
ers,7 and second, courts have proved reluctant to interfere with merg-
ers merely because of minority dissent.8 Thus, claims that freeze-out
mergers treat minority shareholders unfairly, or are otherwise ineq-
uitable, have often been dismissed as improper subjects for judicial
inquiry,9 especially in view of the existence of an appraisal remedy.' 0
Several courts have recently invoked fiduciary principles to up-
hold minority shareholders' claims that a freeze-out merger was used
solely to benefit the controlling interests in a corporation, rather than
to further a business necessity. " Hence, attempts have been made to
enunciate standards under which minority shareholders can be pro-
tected from such overreaching while maintaining necessary
corporate flexibility. 2 Thus far the most notable attempt to offer this
Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929) (use of redeemable stock to freeze-out minority compared to use of
debt).
6. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct.
1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1970).
7. Statute provisions that sanction the payment of cash for shares make freeze-out merg-
ers possible. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.214
(West 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CoR. L. § 902 (West
1963).
8. In MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, -, 157 A. 396, 398
(Ch. 1928), the court stated,
When, therefore, the law provided that a merger might be effected if approved by the
votes of stockholders of each corporation representing two-thirds of its total capital
stock, it was no doubt believed that the interests of all the stockholders in the merging
companies would be sufficiently safeguarded. Such being the case, it is manifest that
the court should not, by its injunctive process, prevent a merger so approved unless it
is clear that it would be so injurious and unfair to some minority complaining stock-
holders as to be shocking, and the court is convinced that it is so grossly unfair to
such stockholders as to be fraudulent.
9. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
10. Some state statutes provide that appraisal is an exclusive remedy. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373(0 (West 1960); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.405(l)(Baldwin
197-). Other statutes make appraisal exclusive if elected unless the dissenting share holder can
show that the merger is ultra vires, fraudulent or unlawful. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-
1202(j) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:I 1-5(2) (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW § 623(k)
(McKinney Supp. 1977). Appraisal has also been made exclusive by judicial construction.
See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (DeL Ch. 1971); Beloff
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949). But see Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 DeL Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
11. E.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974),
affd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (DeL 1977);
Gabhart v. Gabhart, - Ind. -, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.
2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aIrd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (freeze-out
lacking business purpose constitutes fraud under SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.§ 240. 1Ob-5) rev'd
430 U.S. 462 (1977); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (1977) (freeze-out lacking business
purpose constitutes breach of fiduciary duty); Gabhart v. Gabhart, - Ind. -, 370 N.E.2d 345
(1977) (freeze-out lacking business purpose constitutes de facto dissolution); People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), a d, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377
N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975) (freeze-out lacking business purpose constitutes fradulent practice under
state blue sky law).
protection to minority shareholders has been made in Singer v.
Magnavox Co., " in which the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
a majority shareholder violates his fiduciary duty owed to the minor-
ity shareholders if he causes the corporation to undergo a freeze-out
merger for the sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders or
upon terms that are not entirely fair to the minority.' 4 The court
further announced that if a violation of this duty occurs, the merger
may be enjoined or other appropriate relief may be ordered. '5 Given
Delaware's past leadership in corporate law, 6 Singer will no doubt
influence courts in jurisdictions when they deal with freeze-outs.
II. The Freeze-Out Merger
Mergers' 7 in which shareholders are frozen out by payments of
cash or debt' are utilized for different reasons.' 9 In a closely held
corporation such a merger may be used to eliminate an unwanted or
dissident shareholder.' Holders of controlling interests in public
corporations have used freeze-out mergers to reacquire undervalued
shares at bargain prices,2' which is a process commonly known as
13. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See also Pennsylvania Mutual Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter
Int'l, Inc., No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975).
14. 380 A.2d at 980.
15. Id.
16. The Delaware General Corporation Law, under which more than one-third of those
corporations whose securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated,
has been referred to as a "national corporation law." E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW, xii (1972) [hereinafter cited as E. FOLK].
17. Every type of merger or consolidation is controlled by the law of the state of incor-
poration. The key requirements of the typical merger statute include the following: (1) agree-
ment on and approval of the terms of the proposed merger by the boards of directors of the
constituent corporations; (2) notice to stockholders of the constituent corporations followed by
a meeting and vote on the agreement of merger, and (3) if the merger is approved, the filing of
a certificate, indicating the terms of the merger and the name changes, with the appropriate
state office. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101, 1103 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251
(1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10-2, 14A:10-3, 14A:10-4 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 902, 903, 904 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
In general, to approve a plan of merger a majority vote of those shareholders entitled to
vote is required, see, e.g., CAl.. CORP. CODE § 152 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c)
(1974), but some states require approval by a two-thirds margin. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:10-3 (West 1969) (two-thirds requirement for corporations organized prior to effective
date of act); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
18. Corporation laws generally permit the use of cash, debt, or other property as consid-
eration in exchange for shares in a merger. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 110(d) (West Supp.
1978); DEi.. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1(2)(c) (West Supp. 1978);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1963).
19. See Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers." A Proposed Ana lsi, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487, 490 (1976).
20. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952); cf. Bennett v. Breuil
Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953) (freeze-out attempted by additional stock
issue).
21. See Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.) vacated and remanded to
determine moomness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah
1974); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 NJ. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975); People v.
"going private."22 Parent corporations may desire to freeze-out
shareholders in a subsidiary when the two are engaged in similar
operations to avoid corporate opportunity conflicts.23 Finally, a
freeze-out may be the consequence of the merger of a target corpora-
tion into the raider.24
The mechanics of a freeze-out merger are relatively simple.25
Assume, for example, that A Corporation is the controlling share
holder26 in B Corporation. To freeze-out any minority shareholders
in B, A need only approve a merger between itself and B under the
terms of which B's shareholders receive cash.27 A will thereby ac-
quire B and the other former shareholders of B will no longer be part
of the surviving enterprise. If the controlling interest in B Corpora-
tion is an individual rather than a corporation, the freeze-out would
be preceded by the formation of a shell corporation with which B
would be merged.28 This shell would receive the individual share
holder's controlling interest in B in return for which the individual
would receive 100 per cent of the shell's stock. The freeze-out of B's
other shareholders can then proceed as described above, leaving the
individual in sole control of the survivor.2 9
Obviously the business necessity of a freeze-out merger varies
depending upon the situation. Reacquisition of shares by controlling
Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aj'd, 50 App. Div. 2d
787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
22. In Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, -, 342 A.2d 566, 570 (1975)
the court gave the following description of "going private":
The facts before the court present a classic example of the now popular concept of
"going private" which, in the vernacular of the financial community, has become the
"newest game in town." Numerous privately-held companies which were taken
"public" by their insiders during the boom market for new issues that prevailed dur-
ing the late 1960's are now, as a result of the current stock market depression, seeking
- through the same insiders - to buy back the public's interest at a fraction of the
price paid by the public for its stock.
3. See note 84 and accompanying text infa.
24. The target or subsidiary corporation often will not be merged directly into the raider
or parent corporation, but rather into a wholly owned subsidiary e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
25. See generaly Balotti, The Elimination of Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to
Section 251 ofthe General Corporation Law ofDelaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976); Greene,
supra note 19; Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded to
determine mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
26. In this context the term "control" refers to the holding of a sufficient number of
shares to guarantee approval of the merger. See note 17 supra. In 1969 the Delaware corpora-
tion law was amended to require majority approval of mergers, rather than the former two-
thirds, DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 251 (1974). See also E. FOLK, supra note 16, at 323.
27. Rather than a direct merger of A Corporation, and B Corporation, A could use or
form a wholly owned subsidiary to merge with B. See e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969, 971-72 (Del. 1977).
28. Corporate codes have generally been interpreted to permit the formation of such
"shell" corporations to consummate a merger. See Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, -,
242 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1952).
29. This type of freeze-out merger is often used when the controlling interestholders in a
corporation wish to cause it to go private, and the merger is often preceded by other steps such
as tender offers and reverse stock splits to reduce the number of shares. See generaly Moore,
supra note 2.
interestholders of a corporation may have no relation to the contin-
ued success of the business, 30 although the ability to freeze-out to
avoid corporate opportunity conflicts may be an essential factor in
business planning.31 Under Singer v. Magnavox Co. 32 these purposes
will now be judged in light of the fiduciary principles discussed in
this note.
III. Singer v. Magnavox Co.
A. Facts
The freeze-out in Singer v. Magnavox Compan 3 3 was the final
phase of an effort by North American Phillips Corporation to take
over Magnavox Company.34 Operating through a subsidiary, North
American acquired approximately eighty-four per cent of
Magnavox's outstanding common stock through a tender offer. A
second subsidiary of North American was then formed with which
the directors of Magnavox unanimously agreed to merge.35 Even
though North American's interest was large enough to assure ap-
proval of the merger,36 a shareholder meeting was held and the
merger was thereby accomplished. The plaintiffs, former Magnavox
shareholders, brought a class action against Magnavox, North Amer-
ican, and North American's two subsidiaries alleging, inter alia,37
that
(1) the merger was fraudulent in that it did not serve any business
purpose other than the forced removal of public minority share-
holders from an equity position in Magnavox at a grossly inade-
quate price to enable North American, through [its subsidiary,] to
obtain sole ownership of Magnavox; (2) in approving the merger,
at a cash price per share to the minority which they knew to be
grossly inadequate, the defendants breached their fiduciary duties
to the minority shareholders .... 38
The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motion to dismiss,
holding that a merger is not fraudulent merely because it lacks a
business purpose, and that plaintiffs' remedy was to seek an ap-
30. See note 86 and accompanying text us/ra.
31. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
32. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
33. Id.
34. All of the enterprises involved were Delaware corporations. Id. at 971.
35. At the time this plan of merger was accepted, Magnavox had nine directors, four
who were also directors of North American and three who had employment contracts with an
option to purchase North American stock after the merger. Id. at 972.
36. See note 17 supra.
37. The plaintiffs also alleged that the merger violatedthe antifraud provisions of the
Delaware Securities Act DEL. CODE, tit. 6, § 7303 (1974). The court held that the plaintiffs,
Pennsylvania residents, lacked standing to sue under the Delaware statute because the fraud
had not occurred in Delaware. 380 A.2d at 980-82.
38. Id. at 972.
praisal.39 On appeal from the dismissal, the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that whether or not a freeze-out with no
business purpose is fraudulent, it does constitute a breach of the ma-
jority's fiduciary duty.' In stating this position, the Supreme Court
rejected the principle that appraisal is an exclusive remedy.4'
B. Applicable Fiduciary Duties Prior to Singer
L Nonmerger Freeze-outs.-Under Delaware law prior to
Singer, the majority shareholder was limited in his actions by a
fiduciary duty owed to the minority share holders,42 which led the
State courts to enunciate two related principles. First, the majority
shareholder could not take action solely to appropriate the corpora-
tion from the minority or to perpetuate his control over it.4 3 Thus,
courts prohibited otherwise legal actions, such as the issuance' or
redemption of stock45 and the manipulation of the date and location
of shareholder meetings,46 if such actions were meant to impair the
minority shareholder's interest or force him out of the corporation.
39. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1356, 1358 (Del. Ch. 1976) rev'd, 380 A.2d
969 (Del. 1977).
40. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
41. Prior to Singer v. Magnaox, Delaware law was inconsistent on the exclusivity of
appraisal as a remedy for minority shareholders dissatisfied with a majority-controlled merger.
Compare Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952), and
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc:, 256 A.2d 680 (DeL Ch. 1969), afd, 278 A.2d 467 [Del. 1970) with
David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971) and Bruce v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961).
42. In Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, -, 120
A. 486, 491 (1923), the court announced,
When, in the conduct of the corporate business, a majority of the voting power in the
corporation join hands in imposing its policy upon all, it is beyond all reason and
contrary, it seems to me, to the plainest dictates of what is just and right, to take any
view other than that they are to be regarded as having placed upon themselves the
same sort of fiduciary character which the law impresses upon the directors in theh'
relation to all the stockholders.
43. In Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, -, 99 A.2d 236, 239 (Ch. 1953),
the court stated, "As a starting point it must be conceded that action by majority stockholders
having as its primary purpose the 'freezing out' of a minority interest is actionable without
regard to the fairness of the price." See aho Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A.
257 (Ch. 1929); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, -,
120 A. 486, 492 (Ch. 1923).
44. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967)
(despite constitutional and statutory authority, shares could not be issued to prevent a share-
holder's takeover attempt); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch.
1953) (claim that shares were issued to freeze-out a minority shareholder set forth a legally
cognizable cause of action even though the charter had been legally amended to permit the
issue).
45. See Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975) (selective redemp-
tion of stock permitted in charter was impermissible if done to perpetuate management in
office).
46. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 197 1)(even if authorized
in by-laws, management could not advance the date of annual meeting to limit the ability of
shareholders to wage a successful proxy fight).
Second, if the majority forced the minority to accept cash for shares,
by virtue of the fiduciary duty the burden would fall on the majority
to show the entire fairness of the price at which the minority was
frozen out.47 This principle applied if the majority caused a sale of
the assets of the corporation to themselves,48 or, if the minority was
frozen-out by merger.49 The burden of proving fairness presumably
existed regardless of the freeze-out's business purpose.5 °
2. Freeze-Out Mergers.-Despite the existence of the fiduciary
principles, Delaware courts prior to Singer permitted freeze-out
mergers5' without an inquiry into purpose 52 and, in some cases,
without a requirement that the majority prove the merger's entire
fairness. 3 This unique treatment of mergers was rationalized in part
by the merger statute's provision that allowed the use of cash consid-
eration.' In particular, this authorization of cash mergers was felt
47. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
The court stated,
Plaintiffs invoke the settled rule of law that Hilton as majority stockholder of
Mayflower and the Hilton directors as its nominees occupy, in relation to the minor-
ity, a fiduciary position in dealing with Mayflower's property. Since they stand on
both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness,
and it must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Id at -, 93 A.2d at 109-10.
48. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1,
120 A. 486 (Ch. 1923).
49. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Intl. Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); cf Bastian v.
Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), afj'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970) (fairness test ap-
plied to exchange rate in interested merger).
50. Cf. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) (entire fairness test ap-
plies regardless of business purpose).
51. The mere fact that a proposed end could not be accomplished by one means was not
held to exclude all possibilities for reaching the desired purpose. See Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940), in which the court permitted the
elimination of dividend arrearages through a merger even though an earlier case, Keller v.
Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936) had not permitted such an elimina-
tion to be accomplished by charter amendment.
52. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bruce v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961). Cf. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machine Corp.,
136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945) (merger accomplished solely to
cancel dividend arrearages on preferred stock was permitted despite the fact that such action
failed to further any purpose for which mergers were intended).
53. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
54. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b)(4) (1974) provides that the agreement of merger shall state
the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into
shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or
consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporation [sic] are not to
be converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corpo-
ration, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation which the
holders of such shares are to receive in exchange for, or upon conversion of such
shares and the surrender of the certificates evidencing them, which cash, property,
rights or securities of any other corporation may be in addition to or in lieu of shares
or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation.
A similar provision exists in the short merger statute. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1974).
both to place minority share holders on notice of the defeasibility of
their interest in the corporation 55 and to provide specific legislative
sanction for the freeze-out merger technique.56
Similarly, in some freeze-out merger cases the existence of an
appraisal remedy was seen to eliminate the need for the majority to
prove fairness. 57 Appraisal, courts reasoned, was intended to give the
dissatisfied minority the value of its shares, 58 and in light of such a
guarantee, it was deemed unnecessary to interfere with the merger
unless gross unfairness of price was shown.
59
C. Application of Fiduciary Principles in Singer
Although the Singer court attempted to reconcile its holding
with cases in which freeze-out mergers were permitted,6 the applica-
tion of fiduciary principles represents a significant departure from
the reasoning of those earlier cases. The court rejected any notion
that the Delaware legislature had granted unlimited authorization
for freeze-out mergers. Although the cash provisions of the merger
statute clearly provided the power to freeze-out minority sharehold-
ers, the court found that the right to freeze-out was not necessarily
coextensive with this power.6 ' Thus, to determine the extent of the
55. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). See
a/so Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1356 (1976), rev'd, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Cf.
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (merger
provisions warn shareholders that accumulated preferred dividends are defeasible).
56. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
57. See note 53 supra.
58. See, eg., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del Ch. 202, -, 178 A.2d 311, 314
(DeL Ch.), wj'd, 11 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
59. In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33 (DeL Ch. 1971),
the court held that
unless the fair value of Schenley stock is so much greater than the total amount of-
fered, or that plaintiffs and other minority shareholders are being otherwise deprived
of clear rights or otherwise so taken advantage of by those charged with a fiduciary
duty towards them as to constitute a form of constructive fraud, or the like, then it
would appear that the parties are merely in dispute as to value, for which appraisal
should be adequate.
60. Generally, the earlier cases were distinguished as not involving a merger with the
sole purpose of freezing out the minority. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977-78 (Del.
1977). While it is true that the earlier freeze-out merger cases were more concerned with the
fairness of the actions than with business purpose, it is not clear that they are so easily distin-
guished. In Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 DeL Ch. 80, -, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (Ch. 1961), for exam-
ple, the court stated that "the reasons for a merger or the business necessity behind it are not
matters for judicial determination."
61. 380 A.2d at 978 (Del. 1977). The court stated,
We agree that, because the power to merge is conferred by statute, every stockholder
in a Delaware corporation accepts his shares with notice thereof. Indeed, some Dela-
ware decisions have noted that to "the extent authorized by statute,. . . [mergers] are
'encouraged and favored.'" Beyond question, the common law right of a single
stockholder to simply veto a merger is gone. But it by no means follows that those in
control of a corporation may invoke the statutory power [to merge]... when their
purpose is simply to get rid of the minority. On the contrary as we shall ultimately
conclude here, just as a minority shareholder may not thwart a merger without cause,
neither may a majority cause a merger to be made for the sole purpose of eliminating
a minority on a cash-out basis.
right to freeze-out, the court turned to the fiduciary duty owed by the
majority.
An examination of this duty naturally led the court to the fiduci-
ary principle that the majority cannot use its power solely to appro-
priate the corporation from the minority or otherwise perpetuate
control;62 the use of power solely to eliminate shareholders is also a
breach of duty.63 Therefore, the complaint of Magnavox sharehold-
ers, which alleged that the freeze-out had been accomplished without
a business purpose, could not be dismissed.'
The renewed emphasis on fiduciary duty also resulted in the
court's conclusion that the majority must show the merger's entire
fairness,65 which indicates that appraisal will no longer be viewed as
the minority's exclusive remedy.66 The scope of the fiduciary duty
owed by the majority was not explicitly defined by the court since it
recognized that" 'no hard and fast rule could be formulated.' ",67 If
appraisal were viewed as an exclusive remedy, however, it would
define the fiduciary duty owed by the majority only in terms of the
value of the shares frozen out. Hence, to fully vindicate the minor-
ity's rights the court adopted the broad entire fairness rule.
IV. Delaware Law Subsequent to Singer v. Magnavox Co.
Since Singer was decided on a motion to dismiss, the court con-
sidered only the broad notions of fiduciary duty and did not analyze
specific actions in light of those duties. Thus, the decision left unan-
swered the following substantive questions concerning the permissi-
bility of freeze-out mergers. (1) When would a court find a valid
purpose for a freeze-out merger 68 (2) what elements should the ma-
Id at 978 (citations omitted).
62. See notes 43 and 46 and accompanying text supra. See also Baron v. Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975) appeal dismissed 365 A.2d 136 (Del. 1976).
63. 380 A.2d at 979-80 (Del. 1977).
64. Id. at 980.
65. After stating its holding, the court continued,
This is not to say, however, that merely because the Court finds that a cash-out
merger was not made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, all
relief must be denied to the minority stockholders in a § 251 merger. On the con-
trary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority stockholders remains
and proof of a purpose, other than such freeze-out, without more, will not necessarily
discharge it. In such case the court will scrutinize the circumstances for compliance
with the Sterling [v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 DeL Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct.
1952)] rule of "entire fairness" and, if it finds a violation thereof will grant such relief
as equity may require.
Id at 980.
66. "In our view, defendants cannot meet their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs simply
by relegating them to a statutory appraisal proceeding." Id. at 977.
67. Id. citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, -, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939), a
nonmerger case in which the court was concerned with the fiduciary duties of directors who
make personal use of a business opportunity properly belonging to the corporation.
68. See notes 73-86 and accompanying text infra The only concern of the court in
jority emphasize to prove a merger's entire fairness;69 (3) to what
extent should freeze-out mergers be subject to the delays of a trial to
determine the majority's compliance with fiduciary duty;7°and (40
do the principles of Singer apply with equal force to short mergers?7
Several cases in the year following Singer have begun to answer
these questions.72
A. Valid Purpose- In Singer the court held that a merger
"made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders is
an abuse of the corporate process. . . ."" Conversely, in Tanzer Y.
International General Industries, Inc.,7 4 decided less than one month
after Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court permitted a freeze-out
merger upon a showing of a "bona fide purpose" other than the
elimination of minority shareholders."5 Therefore, under Tanzer a
majority shareholder may cause a freeze-out merger to satisfy its
own interest, even though there are no benefits to the controlled cor-
poration, "but that interest must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the
real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted minority sharehold-
ers . . ,76
The Tanzer rule might face criticism that if the majority stock-
holder is truly a fiduciary, he should not be able to control the corpo-
ration for his own purposes no matter how bona fide those purposes
may be.77 This assertion would be true only if the majority share
holder acts as a corporate director. When voting as a shareholder in
a merger, however, the majority holder has the legal right to vote in
his own interest,78 and based on Tanzer it appears that any fiduciary
Singer was whether a complete lack of business purpose would be a breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, the court was not concerned with whose business purpose could be asserted to satisfy
that duty. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 n. II (Del. 1977).
69. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 95-101 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 102-115 and accompanying text bmfra.
72. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Najjar v.
Roland Int'L Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (DeL
Ch. 1978); Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (DeL Ch. 1977).
73. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (DeL 1977) (emphasis added).
74. 379 A.2d 1121 (DeL 1977). Tanzer was an action for a preliminary injunction
brought by minority shareholders of Kliklok Corporation to prevent a freeze-out merger con-
trolled by Kliklok's majority shareholder, International General Industries, Inc. (I.G.I.).
75. Id The Tanzer court used the phrase "bona fide purpose." rather than "business
purpose" used by the plaintiffs in Singer, because, "at best, the phrase 'business purpose' is
ambiguous and, at worst, it states a result and not a right or duty." Id at 1123.
76. Id at 1124.
77. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) the Supreme Court stated, "[The major-
ity shareholder] cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter
how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements."
78. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36,45 (3d Cir. 1947). See generaly Com-
ment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders, 9 HAS-
TtNOs L.J. 306 (1950); Heil v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 17 Del Ch. 214, 151 A. 303 (Ch.
1930); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 487
(Ch. 1923).
duties imposed must be viewed in light of this voting right.79
While Tanzer effectively illuminates the problem of balancing a
majority shareholder's voting rights with his fiduciary duty, the court
failed to define the nature of the bona fide purposes that would out-
weigh that duty. Nevertheless, from Tanzer and other cases apply-
ing similar standards, 0 several generalizations can be made. First,
in addressing the bona fide purpose standard, if a freeze-out merger
is reasonably necessary to the continued existence of a business en-
terprise it will be permitted.8 Thus, in Tanzer the court allowed a
freeze-out merger to enable the parent to obtain long-term financ-
ing.8 2 Other courts have approved freeze-out mergers based on the
need to solve a corporation's financial difficulties,83 or to enable a
parent and its subsidiary to reduce overlapping expenses and avoid
corporate opportunity difficulties." Second, the court will consider
whether the freeze-out is a mere pretext and whether the asserted
business need could be satisfied in some other manner.8 5 Last, if the
freeze-out is not necessary to a continuing enterprise and is used
only as a means for individual or corporate profits or to maintain
control, the purpose will not be considered bona fide. 6 In essence,
current case law indicates that a freeze-out merger that is designed to
aid in the stability or expansion of a continuing enterprise will be
allowed, but if such a merger is proposed only to protect a share-
79. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977) ("the approach to the
[business] purpose issue should be made by first examining the competing claims between the
majority and minority stock holders of Magnavox"); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc.,
379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977) ("as in Singer, the competing rights at stake in this contro-
versy are basically those between majority and minority stockholders").
80. Other courts considering freeze-out mergers have applied a "business purpose stan-
dard." See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974),
affd, 521 F.2d 812 85th Cir. 1975); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), afd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). It does not ap-
pear, however, that application of such a business purpose standard would yield results sub-
stantially different from the bona fide purpose standard.
81. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 [N.D. Fla.
1974), afld, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977); Schulwolfv. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976);
Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.
2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d
1025 (1952).
82. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus. Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977).
83. See, e.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
84. See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974), af'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
85. See Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
86. See Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1280 (2d Cir.)vacated and re-
manded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.,
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
holder's control or to allow personal aggrandizement, the merger
will be enjoined.
B. Entire Fairness
The Tanzer court found a bona fide purpose for the freeze-out
merger, 87 yet it determined that the Chancellor had reviewed only
the fairness of value and not the entire fairness of the merger as re-
quired by Singer.88 Although the court did not define the elements of
the fairness test, it remanded the case for a fairness hearing.89
The fairness test may be flexible and changing,9' but to satisfy
Singer's mandate, courts should make two general inquiries. The
majority should be required to prove that its assumptions and calcu-
lations in reaching the cash out price were reasonable and accurate,9'
which is similar to an appraisal.92 Beyond this, however, the court
must also determine whether prior to or at the time of the merger the
majority had taken any action to inhibit the minority's proportionate
interest in the corporation. Thus, the majority's diversion of a cor-
porate opportunity, which damages the corporation and consequen-
tially the minority's interest therein, could affect the fairness of
merger.93 Similarly, if the majority timed the merger to take advan-
tage of an unusually low market value of the corporation's shares, a
fairness question could be raised.94 Hence, whenever the majority
may rightfully cause the minority to be frozen out, the court must
87. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
88. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977).
89. Id.
90. See note 96 and accompanying text infra.
91. See, e.g., Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 682 (Del. Ch. 1969), afl'd, 278 A.2d
467 (DeL 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432 [Del. Ch.
1968).
92. In an appraisal all the factors of value must be taken into account to determine the
shareholders interest in the going concern. These factors include market value, asset value,
dividends, earnings, the type of business, and any other indications of the corporation's future.
See Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, -, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950); E.
FOLK supra note 16, at 380-91.
93. In David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968), minor-
ity shareholders of A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. contended inter alia, that a merger with Spald-
ing's majority shareholder, Dunhill, International, Inc., was unfair because of Dunhill's
interference with Spalding's corporate opportunities. The court, agreeing that such interfer-
ence could cause unfairness, stated,
Plaintiffs allege that Dunhill diverted to itself the opportunity to acquire Child Gui-
dance and that this was done in violation of its fiduciary duty to the public stockhold-
ers. Dunhill argues that this issue is not relevant to the fairness of the merger terms
but I cannot say, on this record, that as a matter of law it is not. [Defendant's expert]
valuation is based on the inclusion of Child Guidance as part of Dunhill and not of
Spaulding. [Plaintiff's expert] uncontested affidavit states that if Child Guidance be-
longs to Spalding "this would confer a significant advantage and an additional ele-
ment of value for Spalding." It follows that the contention is relevant to valuation.
Id at -, 249 A.2d at 435.
94. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, -, 342 A.2d 566, 573
(1975). See generally Herrmann, Changes in the Merger Provisions of the Delaware General
Corporation Law Since 1967, 3 DEL. J. CoRp. L., 307, 310-12 (1978).
not only scrutinize the actual cash price given to the minority, but
also the base from which that price was computed.
C Avoidance of Delays in Legitimate Freeze-Outs
Since judicial scrutiny of freeze-outs is liberally granted by
Singer, some delay may occur even in legitimate freeze-out merg-
ers.95 One question to be considered is the extent to which the legiti-
macy of freeze-outs may be determined at preliminary stages to
avoid the need for a trial in each case.
The Tanzer court's refusal to issue a preliminary in junction in-
dicates a willingness both to examine the existence of a bona fide
purpose at the preliminary injunction stage and to limit the minor-
ity's remedy for unfairness to damages. 96 In a more recent Delaware
decision, 97 however, the Chancery Court issued a preliminary in-
junction and sent the case to trial without examination of the major-
ity's asserted business purposes.98 In so doing, the court failed to give
adequate weight to the fact that to obtain a preliminary injunction,
the burden is on the plaintiff to show his probability of success on
the merits.9 9 To meet this burden in the face of alleged bona fide
purposes, the plaintiff in a freeze-out merger case should be required
to show grounds to believe the asserted purpose fails to reflect the
majority's true motives or that the purpose can be accomplished
without a freeze-out.1°° If the plaintiff fails to overcome the asserted
purpose, merger should be allowed without further delay. °10
95. Under Singer a complaint cannot be dismissed if it alleges that a merger lacks a
business purpose. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). See also Najjar v.
Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978).
96. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977). Singer
did not require the enjoining of freeze-out mergers. Instead the court required that the relief
be "appropriate under the circumstances." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del.
1977). In a concurring opinion Justice McNeilly expanded on this, stating,
Upon finding a breach of the fiduciary duty owed, the Court must then grant such
relief as the circumstances require, by injunction, appraisal, damages, or other avail-
able equitable relief, if any, keeping in mind, however, the continuing legislative ap-
proval of mergers and the judicially mandated avoidance of their disruption by
dissenting stockholders.
Id at 982 (McNeilly, J., concurring).
97. Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
98. The asserted purposes of the merger were to combine operations and avoid corpo-
rate opportunity problems. Id at 243. These purposes have been accepted by several other
courts. See note 84 supra.
99. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l. Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 436 (Del. Ch.
1968).
100. Cf. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., No. 76-1948 slip op. (E.D. Pa. 1978) (un-
controverted business purpose of majority is grounds for summary judgment when federal
procedure applicable); Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 181-82, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (plaintilf had
not shown merger sufficiently lacking in business rationale to merit preliminary injunction in
light of defendant's statements and supporting affidavits concerning business purpose); accord,
Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 296-98, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 962-63 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
101. Early determination of issues also avoids giving aid to the "obdurate and obstruc-
D Short Mergers
Singer v. Magnavox Co., o2 dealt only with a freeze-out accom-
plished by a long-form merger, 10 3 which requires shareholder ap-
proval. °4 Under Delaware law'015 and the laws of other states,
106
however, a parent corporation that owns ninety per cent or more of
the outstanding shares of a subsidiary may merge the latter upon a
resolution of the parent's board and the filing of the resolution with
the appropriate state agency. 107 By utilizing the short-form merger
the subsidiary's minority shareholders may be cashed out without
advance notice and without the formality of a vote.'
In Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., lO a pre-Singer case, the
Delaware Supreme Court, in refusing to enjoin a freeze-out accom-
plished through a short merger, stated, "[Tihe very purpose of the
[short merger] statute is to provide the parent corporation with a
means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enter-
prise.""110 The Singer court failed to expressly overrule Stauffer, "'!
and the question remained whether short mergers continued as an
exception to the majority's fiduciary duty.
In Kemp v. Angel" 2 and Naji'ar v. Roland International Corp.,
both decided after Singer, the Delaware Court of Chancery failed to
find any distinguishing features of the short merger statute that
would allow an exception to the bona fide purpose standard. 14 In
Kemp the court reasoned,
[I]n liht of the strict standards of fiduciary duty imposed on a
majority stockholder of a Delaware corporation by the Supreme
Court of Delaware in any intra co- orate transaction which in-
volves the alleged diminishing of the Aghts of minority stockhold-
ers in their shares as a result of action proposed to be imposed on
such a minority by the majority sitting on both sides of the bar-
gaining table I fail to see how a determination as to whether or not
tionist minority ... engaged in a 'hold-up' of legitimate majority desires, motivated solely by
greed for the top dollar obtainable." Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
102. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
103. Id at 980.
104. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974).
105. Id. at § 253 (1974).
106. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE, § 1110 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1005 (West
1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 905 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
107. The New York short merger statute requires that the parent have 95% interest in
the subsidiary. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 905(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
108. The Delaware statute does, however, provide for notice to minority shareholders
after the merger is complete. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(d) (1974).
109. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
110. Id at -, 187 A.2d at 80.
111. Instead of overruling Stauffer, the court stated, "Any statement in Stauffer inconsis-
tent herewith is held inapplicable to a § 251 [long-form] merger." Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
112. 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
113. 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978).
114. Id at 712-13; Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 244 (Del. Ch. 1977).
the duty now imposed on a majority stockholder in a merger
based on 8 Del. C. Section 253 [the short merger statute] has been
properly carried out requires any less scrutiny by the Trial Court
than that called for in a case in which the rights of minority stock-
holders have been allegedly diminished by a merger based on 8
Del. C. Section 251 [the long-form merger statute]."
5
Thus, when a short merger is proposed solely to freeze-out the mi-
nority it too will be subject to an injunction.
V. Conclusion
Several courts have accepted the fiduciary principle that freeze-
out mergers should not be allowed absent a business purpose yet it is
too soon to conclude that Singer will become the majority rule." 1
6
Courts have exhibited great reluctance, however, to impose further
substantive fairness requirements, such as those mandated by the
Delaware Supreme Court.1 7 The Supreme Court of Indiana, for ex-
ample, recently indicated that Singer's entire fairness test would
cause unwarranted intrusion into corporate management."
8
Federal regulation of freeze-outs remains uncertain. Although
several federal courts have held that a breach of fiduciary duty by
majority shareholders may constitute fraud under rule lOb-5," 9 the
115. 381 A.2d 241, 244 (Del. Ch. 1977) (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974), af§d, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Gabhart v. Gabhart, - Ind. -, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977);
Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct.
1976); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 50
App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
117. See, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976). The court in Tanzer plainly
deemphasized fairness.
The court at this time need not make a detailed analysis of the respective contentions
of the financial experts as to the appropriate price-earnings multiples, capitalization
of profits, book value, liquidity of assets, monetary trends and future prospects. It is
apparent that there is no palpable or gross undervaluation, which on its face would
shock the conscience of the court. The niceties and discrepancies of any possible
price adjustment should appropriately be left for the appraisal proceedings.
Id at 178-79, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
118. Gabhart v. Gabhart, - Ind. -, -, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (indicating, however,
that a merger would be enjoined for lack of business purpose).
119. See Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.) vacated and remanded to
determine mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
SEC Rule lOb-5 provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as afraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
United States Supreme Court recently rejected this theory, holding
in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green'20 that a breach of fiduciary duty
would not be prohibited by Rule lOb-5 unless that breach was ac-
companied by manipulation or deception.' 2' As an alternative ap-
proach, the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed SEC
Rule 13e-3' 22 to govern any freeze-out that causes a corporation to
delist from an exchange or to deregister from the reporting require
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.123 When applicable,
Rule 13e-3 would set disclosure standards and require that the terms
of such a freeze-out meet federal fairness standards. 124
Although the degree of judicial scrutiny may vary, the current
trend is toward application of fiduciary principles to freeze-out
mergers. Courts mandating a business purpose or bona fide purpose
standard should enjoin mergers that are based solely on desires to
eliminate minority shareholders, but should uphold mergers that rest
upon the majority's legitimate business necessities.'2 Furthermore,
even though a merger is upheld, courts applying the entire fairness
test should scrutinize the cash-out price and assess damages for any
deficiencies.
DAVID A. SPRENTALL
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (emphasis added).
Applying Rule lOb-5 to a freeze-out merger, the court in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
supra at 1289-90, stated, "While the 'fraud' at which lOb-5 is aimed obviously includes the
classic examples of misrepresentation and nondisclosure. .. it is by no means limited to that
type of illegality." The court then cited Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1888) for the
proposition that fraud includes "'a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed ... ' Green v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., supra at 1290.
120. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
121. The Supreme Court reasoned that the sweep of Rule lOb-5 is controlled by § 10(b)
of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), which refers only to manipulation and
deception. Thus, the Court concluded, Rule lOb-5 could not be read to cover a mere breach of
fiduciary duty. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977). See generally
Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb's Proscriptions Against Corporate Mismanagement,6 SEC.
REG. L.J. 3 (1978).
122. Proposed S.E.C. Rule 13e-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60100 (1977). See also Proposed
Schedule 13E-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60102 (1977).
123. For a discussion of the federal securities law implications of freeze-outs, see Com-
ment, Federal Regulation ofthe Going Private Phenomenon, 6 CUM. L. REV. 141 (1975).
124. § 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976), includes
a prohibition on fraudulent as well as manipulative and deceptive actions and, therefore, is not
subject to the same limitations as Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). If a breach of
fiduciary duty is included in the definition of fraud, a rule promulgated under § 13(e) could
reach freeze-outs meant only to buy out the minority shareholders. Under Proposed SEC Rule
13e-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60100-101 (1977), both fraud and unfairness are proscribed. A note
to the rule indicates the factors to be considered in determining fairness. Id at 60101.
125. Judicial recognition of business purpose standards has prompted much commen-
tary on possible justifications for freeze-outs. See generally Borden, Going Private-Old Tort,
New Tort or No Tort? 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note on 'Going Prtvate, '61
VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Moore, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2.
